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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the limits to corporate social responsibility by 
presenting and discussing the case of Gjensidige Insurance Company and its efforts to 
contribute to organized crime prevention. Based on a stage model for corporate social 
responsibility, this paper argues that the Gjensidige case might be found at the most advanced 
maturity level, which is the contribution stage of proactive involvement in society. At this 
final maturity level, corporate executives as well as all other organizational members perceive 
their business as part of a greater course in society. They take on a comprehensive and active 
responsibility in the local as well as global society, and they look for opportunities in society 
where the company can make a difference. 
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Limits to Corporate Social Responsibility: 
The Case of Gjensidige Insurance Company 
and Hells Angels Motorcycle Club 
 
 
 
Introduction 
For more than a decade, Gjensidige Insurance Company in Norway has been in possession of 
a pledge in one of Hells Angels’ club houses. Both police and the municipality would like the 
insurance firm to redeem the pledge to get rid of Hells Angels in the community. However, 
Gjensidige argues this is not their job. They argue that their social responsibility is limited to 
providing insurance policies to customers so that customers can feel financially safe. Fighting 
organized crime groups such as Hells Angels is none of their business, the insurance company 
says (Brandsås, 2011; Holmlund, 2011a, 2011b). 
This article starts by telling the histories of Gjensidige Insurance Company 
(www.gjensidige.com) and Hells Angels Motorcycle Club (www.hells-angels.com), followed 
by a case description of the club house pledge. Next, the concept of social responsibility in 
general and a stage model of social responsibility in particular are presented (Ditlev-
Simonsen, 2010, 2011; Ditlev-Simonsen and Midttun, 2011). The stage model is then applied 
to discuss where Gjensidige can be found in terms of social responsibility maturity. Thus, our 
research question is concerned with the level of maturity found in Gjensidige Insurance 
Company as a limit to their corporate social responsibility. 
 
History of Gjensidige Insurance Company 
Gjensidige has safeguarded assets ever since the first mutual fire insures were established in 
the 1820s. Today Gjensidige emerges as a modern financial group (www.gjensidige.com).  
1820–1920: Gjensidige mutual fire insurers were established throughout the country. As 
many as 260 were in operation around the year 1920. The objective was to ensure favorable 
insurance terms and conditions and low premiums. Life insurance business has been 
conducted since 1847. 
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1921–1985: Around 1920, many mutual fire insurers had risk levels that far exceeded their 
economic capacity. Samtrygd was established as a joint reinsurance company for the mutual 
fire insurers in 1922. The Watchman logo and the slogan “Time passes; Gjensidige endures”, 
were put to use for the first time in 1932 and quickly became a well-recognized brand. In 
1958, Samtrygd was granted a license to engage in insurance business in all sectors with the 
exception of credit insurance. Cooperation between Gjensidige Liv and Samtrygd started in 
1974. Samtrygd changed its name to Gjensidige Skadeforsikring. The companies were placed 
under joint management in 1985. 
1986–1998: Gjensidige evolved into a financial group, offering a full range of general, life 
and pension insurance products, as well as banking and financial products. 
The business expanded significantly through the acquisition of the Forenede Group in 1993. 
1999–2005: Gjensidige Forsikring and Sparebanken NOR coordinated their operations in the 
new financial group, Gjensidige NOR. The purpose of this coordination was to generate a 
competent and effective financial group, involved in the fields of banking, general and life 
insurance and real estate. In 2002, the business was divided into two cooperating groups, the 
general insurance group, Gjensidige NOR Forsikring and the stock-exchange-listed banking 
and savings group Gjensidige NOR ASA, after which Gjensidige NOR ASA merged with 
DnB and took the name DnB NOR. The cooperation between DNB NOR and Gjensidige 
NOR Forsikring was terminated in 2005, and use of the Gjensidige brand name resumed. 
2005–2010: Through acquisitions, the insurance operations were expanded into Denmark, 
Sweden and the Baltic States. Gjensidige is now also involved in the competition for 
occupational pensions, savings and investments via the newly established company 
Gjensidige Pensjon og Sparing. Gjensidige Bank’s Internet banking service was launched in 
2007. That same year, equity certificates were also issued, and stock exchange listing was 
approved. Due to the financial crisis, the stock exchange listing in 2008 was postponed 
indefinitely In June 2008, extensive organizational changes were implemented by altering the 
distribution from a regional to a divisional structure. In Latvia, the company RESO Europa 
was acquired. The trademark Gjensidige and Gjensidige’s Watchman logo were used in the 
Baltics and in Scandinavia. Citibank’s business in consumer finance was acquired by 
Gjensidige Bank in December 2009. Gjensidige Forsikring BA was converted into a public 
limited company (ASA). At the same time, the Gjensidige Foundation was converted into a 
financial foundation and became the owner of all the shares in the Group. Gjensidige 
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Forsikring ASA was listed on the stock exchange in December. The Gjensidige Foundation 
sold nearly 40 per cent of its shares. 
 
History of Hells Angels Motorcycle Club 
A distinction must be made between non-criminalized and criminalized bikers. The latter 
outlaw bikers are typically motorcycle club members referring to themselves as “1 
percenters”. Among the criminal biker clubs, we find Hells Angels, Outlaws, Bandidos, 
Pagans, Black Pistons, Mongols, and Coffin Cheaters. The most well-known is Hells Angels 
Motorcycle Club (HAMC), which is in charge of many criminal business enterprises all over 
the world. 
Lavigne (1996: 1) described criminal bikers in this way: 
The darkness of crime lies not in its villainy or horror, but in the souls of those who 
choose to live their lives in the abyss. A man who toils from youth to old age to violate 
the line that divides civilization from wilderness, who proclaims he is not of society, 
but an outsider sworn to break its laws and rules, yet who readily seeks refuge in its 
lenient legal system, embraces its judicial paternalism and gains substance from its 
moral weakness; whose very existence as an outlaw is defined by society’s being, is 
but a shadow of the real world, bereft of freedom and doomed to tag along in society’s 
wake. 
When looking back at history of HAMC, it all started in 1948 (www.wikipedia.org – search 
Hells Angels): 
The Hells Angels were originally formed in 1948 in Fontana, California through an 
amalgamation of former members from different motorcycle clubs, such as The Pissed 
Off Bastards of Bloomington. The Hells Angels website denies the suggestion that any 
misfit or malcontent troops are connected with the motorcycle club. However, the 
website notes that the name was suggested by Arvid Olsen, an associate of the 
founders, who had served in the Flying Tigers "Hells Angels" squadron in China 
during World War II. The name "Hells Angels" was believed to have been inspired by 
the common historical use, in both World War I and World War II, to name squadrons 
or other fighting groups by a fierce, death-defying name.  
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HAMC has grown to several thousand members worldwide. Over the years, studies of HAMC 
have repeatedly shown that running an outlaw club costs money and the money is earned by 
organized crime (Wolf, 1991; Quinn and Koch, 2003; Rassel and Komarnicki, 2007). In 
Scandinavia, a war on organized drug crime broke out (www.wikipedia.org – search Hells 
Angels): 
A gang war over drugs and turf between the Hells Angels and the Bandidos, known as 
the "Great Nordic Biker War", raged from 1994 until 1997 and ran across Norway, 
Sweden, Denmark and even parts of Finland and Estonia. By the end of the war, 
machine guns, hand grenades, rocket launchers and car bombs had been used as 
weapons, resulting in 11 murders, 74 attempted murders, and 96 wounded members of 
the involved motorcycle clubs. This led to fierce response from law enforcement and 
legislators, primarily in Denmark. A law was passed that banned motorcycle clubs 
from owning or renting property for their club activities. The law has subsequently 
been repealed on constitutional grounds. 
One of the bombs that exploded during the “Great Nordic Biker War” in 1997 represents the 
historical background for this case study of Gjensidige Insurance Company and Hells Angels 
Motorcycle Club.   
 
Hells Angels Club House Case 
After the bomb exploded in the city of Drammen outside of Oslo in Norway in 1997, police 
investigations concluded that the bomb was placed outside the Bandidos clubhouse by 
members of HAMC Norway. Several HAMC members were convicted to jail sentences. 
Furthermore, Gjenside Insurance Company that had insured the destroyed buildings, paid 
close to one hundred million US dollars to the owners of the buildings. After several court 
sentences against HAMC members, Gjensidige sought repayment from those members. The 
members did not pay, but Gjensidige found out that they owned shares in a clubhouse outside 
the city of Hamar. Gjensidige got a majority pledge in the club house based on the debts of 
these members. Still in 2011, however, Gjensidige has this pledge without taking any actions 
to retrieve the money (Brandsås, 2011; Holmlund, 2011a, 2011b). 
Gjensidige has argued that their role is to retrieve money lost in insurance payments because 
of the Drammen bomb. They say that forcing Hells Angels out of the club house does not 
make sense for three main reasons. First, the value of the club house is less than a million 
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dollars, while they lost a hundred million dollars. Second, the efforts and costs involved in 
throwing HA members out will probably exceed the benefits for Gjensidige. Third, it is not 
the responsibility of a business firm to get involved in law enforcement, even if it is a matter 
of serious organized crime where the firm might make a difference. 
The small town of Ringsaker where the club house is located would very much like to get rid 
of the HA chapter. They see Gjensidige’s pledge as a golden opportunity to get rid of the 
criminals. All politicians in the town have encouraged Gjensidige to use their economic and 
legal force to throw HA members out of the house and then sell it on the open market.  
Similarly, local police in Ringsaker would also very much like to get some help from 
Gjensidige to get rid of the club, the members and the associated criminal activity in drugs, 
prostitution and violence. 
So, the current situation at time of writing this article late 2011 is that Gjensidige has decided 
to give the HAMC house pledge to the town of Ringsaker close to the city of Hamar. This will 
allow the city to foreclose on the Hells Angels and get them out of the community, while 
relieving Gjensidige of what they expect to be a costly legal bill. However, the town council 
does not think it is that simple, so they have turned down the offer. There seem to be no new 
developments emerging into 2012. 
 
Concepts of Corporate Social Responsibility 
Corporate social responsibility is a concept related to the behavior and conduct of 
corporations and those who are associated with them. During the best of times, it is a concept 
adopted and taken for granted. During the worst of times, however, corporate social 
responsibility becomes a threatening concept to most business as well as public organizations 
(Jayasuriya, 2006). Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a set of voluntary corporate 
actions designed to improve corporate impacts on society. These corporate actions not 
required by the law attempt to further some social good and extend beyond the explicit 
transactional interests of the firm. The voluntary nature of CSR means that these activities can 
be viewed as gifts or grants from the corporation to various stakeholder groups (Godfrey et 
al., 2009).  
Basu and Palazzo (2008) define corporate social responsibility as the process by which 
managers within an organization think about and discuss relationships with stakeholders as 
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well as their roles in relation to the common good, along with their behavioral disposition 
with respect to the fulfillment and achievement of these roles and relationships. It is an 
intrinsic part of an organization's character, with the potential to discriminate it from other 
organizations that might adopt different types of processes. 
Corporate social responsibility is a concept by which business enterprises integrate the 
principles of social and environmental responsibility in their operations as well as in the way 
they interact with their stakeholders.  This definition shows two perspectives. First, social and 
environment responsibility in their operations requires internal change processes to integrate 
the principles into business operations. Second, interactions with stakeholders require 
stakeholder engagement (Zollo et al., 2009). 
The concept of corporate social responsibility developed as a reaction against the classical and 
neo-classical recommendations from economics, where rational decision-making and free 
markets are concentrated solely on profits. This narrow economic view has been questioned 
due to inconsistencies with the economic model and the evidence of unethical business 
practices. These problems have led to the realization that organizations should also be 
accountable for the social and environmental consequences of their activities (Mostovicz et 
al., 2009). 
Corporate motivation for CSR can be explained through several theories. However, research 
shows that stakeholders (board members NGOs and consumers) think mangers are motivated 
by branding and reputation. The same stakeholders furthermore think the managers should be 
motivated by sustainability.  
 
Frontiers of Corporate Responsibility 
According to Jayasuriya (2006), the frontiers of corporate responsibility continue to expand, 
casting a wider net to encompass almost all those who have something to do with corporate 
practices and management. Therefore, the regulatory landscape is rapidly changing and 
trained staff in corporations is required to deal with the new requirements. Staff training and 
supervision are major undertakings to improve the ability to carry out tasks involved in 
corporate social responsibility. 
At the core of corporate social responsibility is the idea that it reflects the social imperatives 
and the social consequences of business success. It consists of clearly articulated and 
communicated policies and practices of corporations that reflect business responsibility for 
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some of the wider societal good. It is differentiated from business fulfillment of core profit-
making responsibility and from the social responsibilities of the government and public 
authorities (Matten and Moon, 2008). 
Matten and Moon (2008) make a distinction between explicit and implicit corporate social 
responsibility. First, explicit responsibility describes corporate activities that assume 
responsibility for the interests of society, while implicit responsibility describes corporate role 
within the wider institutions in society. Next, explicit responsibility consists of voluntary 
corporate policies, while implicit responsibility consists of values and norms. Finally, explicit 
responsibility involves incentives and opportunities motivated by expectations, while implicit 
responsibility is motivated by societal consensus. 
Furthermore, even if it looks like corporations are doing more and more within CSR, research 
shows that the increase in CSR communication mostly reflects openness about already 
ongoing CSR activities within the corporations.  
The idea of coupling decoupling (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), suggests that even though 
corporations start to engage in new CSR rituals, this does not necessarily imply actual 
changes in the corporation. The ritual is decoupled from the corporation’s day to day business 
(Weaver, Trevino, & Cochran, 1999) . This suggests that even though corporations claim to 
be more concerned about CSR and sets goals to become more sustainable, this does not 
necessarily imply that the company has become more responsible.  
It can be argued that size, responsibility and hierarchical structure of large business 
corporations sometimes foster conditions that are conductive to organizational deviance and 
financial crime. In many situations of economic instability and crisis, the nature of 
organizational goals may promote illegal behavior. Organizational goals can easily be 
perceived as absolute requirements with personal consequences following non-achievement. 
Therefore, goals may seem to justify almost any means used to fulfill goals (Dion, 2008). 
Abuse of responsibility, rather than corporate social responsibility, may occur when the type 
of structure allows the company to decouple components if that is deemed necessary. Rules 
may be violated, decisions not implemented and inspection systems subverted or rendered so 
vague as to provide little coordination (Dion, 2008). 
Corporate social responsibility has not been equally addressed in every country around the 
globe. Hansen (2009) argues that American corporations so far have been leading the trend 
towards increased awareness, with corporations in some other parts of the world just entering 
9 
 
the debate. Furthermore, size matters: large corporations are much more likely to keep track 
of and communicate their CSR engagement and activities. For example, almost all Financial 
Times 500 corporations report about CSR, while small companies are much less engaged in 
CSR. Maybe this is due to the reduced risk of brand value loss for unknown corporations. 
Godfrey et al. (2009) phrased the question: Do shareholders gain when managers disperse 
corporate resources through activities classified as corporate social responsibility? Strategy 
scholars have recently developed a theoretical model that links such activities to shareholder 
value when a firm suffers a negative event. The insurance-like property of corporate social 
responsibility can be tested. Such activity can lead to positive attributions from stakeholders, 
who then temper their negative judgments and sanctions towards firms because of this 
goodwill.  
Godfrey et al. (2009: 425) extended the risk management model by theorizing that some types 
of responsibility actions will be more likely to create goodwill and offer insurance-like 
protection and found a positive answer to the above question: 
We find that participation in institutional CSR activities - those aimed at a firm's secondary 
stakeholders or society at large - provides 'insurance-like' benefit, while participation in 
technical CSRs - those activities targeting a firm's trading partners - yields no such benefits.  
The frontiers of corporate social responsibility are moving into a focus on a new relationship 
between business and society. That is, according to Waddock and McIntosh (2009), new ways 
of looking at the corporation and its role in society, both in practice and in management 
education. Management education, which has been criticized in the financial crisis period, has 
an important role to play, but in a changed form. Corporate responsibility is becoming a social 
movement. 
 
Levels of Corporate Responsibility 
Based on the reviewed literature on stage models and CSR, a maturity model for CSR is 
suggested in the following. It is the idea of a pattern over time with progression and 
accumulation that is important here, rather than the applied terms and characteristics at each 
level. For managers, each of the four stages can appear to represent a different world view of 
the place of the corporation within society and the resulting responsibilities of corporations 
and their executives. Therefore, we suggest that the actions taken by corporate managers at 
different levels of CSR are likely to be different, and this is exemplified with the story of 
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Hells Angels in Norway. In the Figure, this idea is presented in terms of the following four 
stages or levels: 
1. Business stage of profit maximization for owners within the corporate mission. At this 
basic maturity level, the company is only concerned with itself and its owners. In 
addition, the company is out to please customers, so that they will continue buying its 
goods and services. The only responsibility corporations have is that of maximizing 
profits to shareholders while engaging in open and free competition, without deception 
or fraud (Adeyeye, 2011). To make decisions that serve other interests at the expense 
of shareholders would represent a breach in trust and loyalty. It would be like taking 
money away from owners, it would be like theft. Corporate executives have no right to 
behave as modern Robin Hood types where money is taken from the rich and given to 
the poor. At this stage, there is no acceptance of the legitimacy of stakeholders other 
than the owners of the firm, where the owners of the firm represent the only relevant 
stakeholders whose profit is to be maximized.  
Stage 1 managers believe in maximizing profits without any other obligations. The 
decision about what to do about Hells Angels is strictly based on a financial cost-
benefit analysis of this particular decision. In financial terms, there is less than one 
million US dollars in benefits to be expected, while the internal and external costs of 
court proceedings will far exceed this amount. Profit-maximizing managers will not 
consider how their decision might upset the public and various levels of government, 
as they will argue that a firm has no right to enter the role of public prosecutor of 
motorcycle organizations. A firm should never take on a law enforcement role, as this 
is left to the government that has been elected by the people in a democracy. If a firm 
takes the law in its own hands, it has no democratic legitimacy to do so. In terms of 
future sales and profitability, there is no consequence to be expected, as insurance 
customers will understand that there is no legitimate role for the firm to fight other 
organizations. Also, other negative firm cases have illustrated that the public in 
general and customers in particular, quickly forget the story and therefore return to, or 
even stay at, normal customer behavior as before. The case of a large diary firm in 
Norway, Tine, illustrates this point, where milk drinking customers returned to Tine 
milk a few weeks after the corruption scandal became publicly known. Tine had 
bribed major superstore chains so that competitors received little or no space on store 
shelves. CSR scholars may argue that these managers act short-sighted, but these 
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managers are determined to deliver controllable profits to the owners both in the short 
and in the long run.  
2. Function stage of establishing a function for corporate social responsibility in the 
company. At this second maturity level, business executives have understood that they 
need to address company relationships with the outside world in a professional way.  
Out of necessity and external expectations, a CSR function is established within the 
company staffed with individuals who have a business perspective. This function is to 
survey implications of business activities in the external environment, develop 
intelligence to learn about external reactions to business practices, and conduct risk 
assessments in terms of effects on corporate reputation. Here, Basu and Palazzo 
(2008) define corporate social responsibility as a process. The process implies that 
corporate leaders in the organization reflect over and discuss relationships with 
stakeholders and partners. The process also implies that corporate leaders identify 
their own and the organization's roles in relation to societal conditions and societal 
utility. This kind of reflection and discussion will cause them to fill their roles with 
relevant content and action. It is an internal process in the organization that leads to 
conscious actions externally, and that will distinguish external processes from internal 
processes, as well as distinguish company processes from processes of other 
companies, because process development started internally in the organization.  
Stage 2 managers believe in maximizing profits with some external obligations. The 
decision about what to do about Hells Angels is based on a communication 
perspective, where the firm is willing to help others to reach their goals. Managers are 
willing to inform the police and local municipality about the firm’s involvement and 
claims against Hells Angels at Ringsaker ourside Hamar in Norway. This process 
implies that corporate leaders have identified their own role as information providers 
where the firm does not get involved in external law enforcement processes as such.  
3. Resource stage of resource mobilization for potential threats and opportunities. At 
this level, we find a complete, yet passive form of corporate social responsibility. It 
represents a reactive strategy where the company has mobilized resources for cases of 
emergency. The company is prepared for crisis management as well as opportunity 
exploration and exploitation. Opportunities may emerge where corporate executives 
will implement opportunistic behavior to gain from opportunities in terms of 
strengthening corporate reputation. CSR at this level is a concept that makes the 
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company integrate principles of social and environmental responsibility and 
engagement in its activities both internally and externally. With this definition, two 
perspectives emerge. First, CSR implies a strong link to internal business processes. 
Second, interactions with stakeholders and the society at large require involvement 
also on the part of stakeholders and the society at large in their relationships to the 
company (Zollo et al., 2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maturity model for corporate social responsibility 
 
Stage 3 managers believe in making resources available to help external stakeholders, 
where firm help can benefit business as well in terms of improved reputation in firm 
environment. This is where we find Gjensidige insurance company in 2011. The firm 
Stage I 
Business Level 
Maximizing profits for 
shareholders without any other 
obligations 
Stage II 
Function Level 
Establishing CSR function within 
the company for risk 
assessments  
Stage IV 
Contribution Level 
Activating corporate actions to 
contribute as an active citizen in 
society 
The only responsibility corporations 
have is that of maximizing profits to 
shareholders while engaging in 
open and free competition, without 
deception or fraud. 
Out of necessity and 
external expectations, a 
CSR function is established 
within the company staffed 
with individuals who have a 
business perspective. 
Corporate 
executives look 
for opportunities 
in society where 
the company 
can make a 
difference. 
Development over time 
Level of 
CSR 
maturity 
Stage III 
Resource Level 
Mobilization of corporate 
resources to be employed in 
cases of emergency The company is prepared for crisis 
management as well as opportunity 
exploration and exploitation. Opportunities 
may emerge where corporate executives 
will implement opportunistic behavior to 
gain from opportunities in terms of 
strengthening corporate reputation. 
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has expressed willingness to help the municipality with legal resources as well as 
transfer of ownership rights to the municipality. Firm resources are made available to 
enable the municipality and the police to throw Hells Angels members out of the 
house based on legal prosecution and ownership action. 
4. Contribution stage of proactive involvement in society. At this final maturity level, 
corporate executives as well as all other organizational members perceive their 
business as part of a greater course in society. They take on a comprehensive and 
active responsibility in the local as well as global society, and they look for 
opportunities in society where the company can make a difference.  
Again we return to the example of the Norwegian insurance company that has a claim 
in the clubhouse of Hells Angels. While the claim has insignificant monetary value 
that was almost impossible to retrieve, the claim can help both municipality and police 
to fight organized crime in society. At this level of CSR, short-term loss to the 
company can be acceptable for the long-term good of society. CSR at this level is a 
long-term commitment to society (Mostovicz et al., 2009). Evidence is emerging that 
long-term citizen commitment on the part of the company does not at all have to harm 
corporate profitability neither in the short-term nor in the long term.  
 
Discussion 
We argue in this paper that corporate managers can be at different levels of ethical maturity 
relative to corporate social responsibility, and that each level will normally lead to different 
decisions. If another level does not lead to a different decision, then the reason for a similar 
decision will be different, while the action is the same. Therefore, the theory of stages is not 
always meant to predict behaviour. 
This paper presents a case study, which might be useful as a teaching case in business ethics 
as well as a reflection for practising managers. In the model, each level of maturity implies a 
deeper acceptance of the legitimacy of stakeholders other than the owners of the firm.  We 
move from the Stage 1 level of maximizing shareholder wealth to the acceptance of the 
responsibilities of corporate citizenship of Stage 4. For managers, each of the four stages may 
appear to represent a different world view of the place of the corporation within society and 
the resulting responsibilities of corporations and their executives.  
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However, unless executives act simplistically, without considering second order 
consequences, the actions they take in situations may not be very different despite their 
different levels of CSR maturity. Their reasoning and rationale may be different, but it is 
possible to demonstrate how they could come to the same conclusions about the appropriate 
actions to take. This is a weakness of the current model, which represents an interesting 
avenue for future research. 
 
Conclusion 
A stages of growth model for corporate social responsibility is proposed in this article and 
applied to the case of Hells Angels club house, where a corporation has the opportunity to 
help society fight organized crime. Whether fighting organized crime is within or outside the 
boundaries of CSR is dependent on the stage. It is argued in this paper that higher stages make 
it more likely that fighting organized crime is within CSR, leading to a decision to act against 
Hells Angels.  
However, as discussed above, several levels in the model may lead to the same decision. 
Therefore, future research should address the problem of suggesting that the actions taken by 
corporate managers at different levels of CSR maturity are likely to be different, while it 
could be argued that actions would be the same, at least in this example of Hells Angels club 
house and Gjensidige insurance company. This issue should be addressed both in terms of a 
possible flaw in the theory and in terms of a possible flaw in predicting behaviours. 
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